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POLICY NOTE   
 
SELLING ITS SOUL: AN ANALYSIS OF A FOR-
PROFIT CORPORATION’S  
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND AUTONOMY IN 
AMERICA 
 
By: Steffen Pelletier
1
 
 
I. Introduction  
 
Is it possible to consider the principles and morals 
upon which a business entity is built as separate from the 
individual shareholders that form the business entity—do 
they make up a “soul”?  
While the question above, on its face, rings more of 
philosophy than law and policy, there is currently a 
substantial question of law that is strikingly similar, if not 
the same, yielded by the contraception mandate of the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“PPACA”).   
In brief, the PPACA, among other things, requires all 
health insurance policies, including those policies made 
available to subscribers through a privately held 
corporation, to provide contraceptive and preventative care 
for women.
2
   Rooted in the fundamental religious beliefs 
they hold, many Americans find this so-called 
“contraceptive mandate” abhorrent.3  Certainly, no one 
would question that it is those Americans’ right to speak 
and act in accordance with that belief.  However, the more 
                                                 
1
 J.D. Candidate 2016, University of Tennessee College of Law.  
2
 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 
Stat. 119 sec. 1001(a)(5), 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg–13(a)(4) (2013). 
3
 Jack Kerwick, Backlash Against Obamacare Contraceptive Mandate, 
THE NEW AM. (Jul. 3, 2013, 15:12), 
http://www.thenewamerican.com/usnews/constitution/item/15891-
backlash-against-obamacare-contraceptive-mandate. 
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complex question arises when dealing with the privately 
held for-profit corporation.  Specifically, assuming a 
private corporation’s fundamental principles on which it 
was built are in direct conflict with the entire notion of 
contraceptive care, what is the extent of Congress’s ability 
to require the corporation to make insurance available 
covering contraceptive care?  
In this policy note, I will address the many 
considerations surrounding a corporation’s legal and moral 
autonomy.   The general threshold question is this: to what 
extent is a for-profit corporation afforded religion and 
speech protections separately and distinctly from its 
shareholders?
4
  I intend this note to serve as a guide 
through the myriad complicated considerations implicated 
by this issue; in addition, I conclude that there is both 
objective value in and legal authority supporting the 
protection of a corporation’s right to act in accordance with 
its religious affiliation.   I will show that a corporation has a 
“soul” of its own—an individual and distinct set of 
principles that should be valued and protected. 
 
II. The Development of the Law: The PPACA and 
“Preventative Health Services” 
  
The PPACA mandates that “preventative health 
services” be included in healthcare plans without any cost 
sharing.
5
  Congress did not initially define “preventative 
health services” and instead authorized the Department of 
Health and Human Services (“DHHS”) to promulgate rules 
to this effect.
6
  DHHS issued a preliminary rule that defined 
the religious employer exception narrowly and included 
                                                 
4
 John K. DiMugno, The Affordable Care Act’s Contraceptive 
Coverage Mandate, 25 No. 1 CAL. INS. L. & REG. REP. 1 (2013).  
5
 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 
2713, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).  
6
 3 RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS AND THE LAW § 13:51 (2013). 
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contraception in the definition of “preventative health 
service.”7  In order to qualify for the “religious employer 
exception,” an organization is required to (1) have the 
inculcation of religious values as its purpose; (2) primarily 
employ persons who share its religious views; (3) primarily 
serve persons who share its religious views; and (4) be a 
nonprofit organization.
8
  Accordingly, this exemption did 
not exempt many religious employers, such as Catholic 
healthcare providers, from being required to offer 
contraception as part of the routine coverage policies they 
offered.
9
  Because the Catholic Church forbids 
contraception, those non-exempt Catholic organizations 
would be forced to either violate their Catholic principles 
or violate the newly enacted law.
10
  Although the DHHS 
attempted to resolve the issue by delaying the date on 
which religious-affiliated nonprofits were required to 
comply with the law by one year and ordered the insurance 
companies of those religious employers to pay for the 
contraception, rather than the employers directly, the 
primary dispute remained: specifically, the Catholic Church 
wanted absolutely no affiliation with the provision of 
contraceptives.
11
   
                                                 
7
 Coverage of Preventive Health Services, 45 C.F.R. § 147.130(a)(iv) 
(2013). 
8
 Id.  
9
 3 RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 6. 
10
 See id.; Pope Paul VI, Humanae Vitae, Vatican (July 25, 1968), 
available at 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/paul_vi/encyclicals/documents/hf_p
-vi_enc_25071968_humanae-vitae_en.html. 
11
 See 45 C.F.R. § 147.130; 3 Religious Organizations and the Law § 
13:51 (citing White House Misrepresents Its Own Contraceptive 
Mandate, United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (Feb. 3, 2012), 
http://www.usccb.org/news/2012/12-020.cfm. Additionally, the 
exemption clause was again amended and expanded to define “religious 
employers” only as those that are considered nonprofit religious houses 
of worship and religious orders as defined by the IRS.  The amended 
contraception mandate, while expanded to include more groups and 
3
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 Additionally, many other nonprofits and for-profits 
corporations have remained unwilling to breach their 
fundamental principles by providing insurance coverage for 
contraceptives.  The crux of this conflict is primarily rooted 
in the interplay between the federal act giving individuals 
statutory claims where the government “substantially 
burdens” her freedom to exercise her religion and case law 
which identifies corporations as individuals. 
 
III. Substantive Law at Issue 
 
A. Religious Freedom Restoration Act  
 
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”) 
of 1993 was a response to the holding of the Supreme 
Court in Employment Div. v. Smith. 
12
  In Smith, the Court 
held that the dispositive issue in evaluating the 
constitutionality of a law under the First Amendment is not 
whether a law suppressed an individual’s religious 
practices.
13
  Rather, the Court held that, so long as the law 
was otherwise “neutral” and “generally applicable” to all 
individuals, the secondary effect of whether the law 
suppressed the religious practices of some is irrelevant.
14
  
In effect, the Court removed the sometimes ambiguous 
                                                                                                 
organization, still did not provide an exemption to other non-profits, 
and more extensively, for-profit corporations that asserted religious 
reasons for exemption.  The amended contraception mandate was 
finalized on June 28, 2013.  However, the mandate’s final version did 
little to mitigate the increased litigation from those still outside of the 
exemption. See generally DiMugno, supra note 4.  
12
 Codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (Supp. V 1993); Emp’t 
Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885 (1990); see 
Douglas Laycock & Oliver S. Thomas, Interpreting the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act, 73 TEX. L. REV. 209, 210 (1994).  
13
 Smith, 494 U.S. at 885. 
14
 Id at 878-81, 876. 
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weighing between two equally valid considerations: a 
compelling government interest and the right an American 
enjoys to practice his or her religion freely.
15
  
Congress acted swiftly through its enactment of the 
RFRA, which was not only intended to replace the Smith 
standard with the compelling interest test, shifting the 
burden of proof to the government, but also to provide 
statutory claims and defenses for an individual where a law 
“substantially burdens” his or her freedom to exercise his 
or her religion.
16
  The RFRA provides that the 
government’s burden is met if it demonstrates that the law 
or policy is “(1) in a furtherance of a compelling 
governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means 
of furthering that compelling governmental interest.”17  
Notably, sub-section (c) provides that “[a] person 
whose religious exercise has been burdened in violation of 
this section may assert that violation as a claim or defense 
in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief 
against a government.”18  To date, the federal circuit courts 
have held that subsection (c)’s use of “person” is 
ambiguous and therefore, the potential application of 
subsection (c) to different organizations and corporations is 
a matter of statutory interpretation.
19
  There is a circuit split 
                                                 
15
 Id at 879. 
16
 The RFRA provides that the “[g]overnment shall not substantially 
burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a 
rule of general applicability[ ]” (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a)); see 
Klemka v. Nichols, 943 F. Supp. 470, 474 (M.D. Pa. 1996) (citing 
Rodriguez v. City of Chicago, No.95C5371, 1996 WL 22964, at *4 
(N.D. Ill. Jan. 12, 1996)).  
17
 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b) (emphasis added). 
18
 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(c). 
19
 Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1129 (10th 
Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013). 
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as to which entities may bring a claim, and, of those, which 
entities may be successful in adjudicating their claims on 
the merits.
20
  
 
B. First Amendment and Citizens United  
 
For-profit corporations raising claims based on the 
RFRA find support in the landmark Supreme Court holding 
in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,
21
 which 
held that corporations enjoy First Amendment 
protections.
22
  The petitioner, Citizens United, sought 
injunctive relief from anticipated civil and criminal 
penalties that would be imposed on it following the release 
of a political documentary within thirty days of the 2008 
Democratic primary elections.
23
  The Court specifically 
held that the First Amendment applies to corporations and 
it “does not permit Congress to make categorical 
distinctions based on corporate identity” concerning 
freedom of speech.
24
  Further, it held that “[n]o sufficient 
governmental interest justifies limits on political speech of 
non-profit or for-profit corporations.”25  Citizens United’s 
                                                 
20
 Id. 
21
 See generally Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 
310 (2010).   
22
 Id. at 886, 917. 
23
 Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 723 F.3d 1114; Korte v. Sebelius, 735 
F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2013); Gilardi v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human 
Servs., 733 F.3d 1208 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (citing Citizens United, 558 
U.S. 310).  
24
 The First Amendment does not permit Congress to make categorical 
distinctions based on the corporate identity of the speaker and the 
content of the political speech. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 364 (citing 
First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 778, n. 14 (1978)). 
25
 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 315. The sweeping implications of the 
holding that a corporation has its own identity that is separate from an 
individual citizen cannot be understated. When analyzing whether a 
section of the Bipartisan Reform Act restricting corporate speech was 
6
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sweeping implication is simply this: “[t]he First 
Amendment protects speech and the speaker, and the ideas 
that flow from each,” regardless of whether the speaker is a 
person in the literal sense or a for-profit corporation.
26
 
 
IV. Action to the Courts  
 
A. Non-Profit Dismissals 
 
Two types of lawsuits have been filed in response to 
the contraception: those brought by nonprofit religious 
employers like the Catholic dioceses, and those brought by 
for-profit companies owned by religious individuals who 
disagree with the use of contraception.
27
  Many of the 
claims brought by nonprofit organizations have been 
dismissed on procedural grounds dealing primarily with 
ripeness.
28
 
 
                                                                                                 
unconstitutional, the Court noted that if the Act were imposed on an 
individual citizen the government’s “time, place, and manner” 
argument would not be accepted, but instead be seen as a government 
action to silence suspect voices.  Id. at 339. 
26
 Id. at 341.  
27
 HHS Mandate Central, THE BECKET FUND fOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, 
http://www.becketfund.org/hhsinformationcentral/, (last visited Jan. 28, 
2014).  Specifically, there have been a total of 91 cases filed by over 
300 plaintiffs, including 46 cases brought by for-profit companies and 
45 cases brought by non-profit organizations.  Additionally, there have 
been 2 class action cases brought.  Of those cases adjudicated on the 
merits, 33 injunctions have been granted and 6 denied in cases filed by 
for-profit companies, and 19 injunctions have been granted and 1 
denied in cases filed by non-profit organizations. See HHS Mandate 
Central, THE BECKET FUND FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, 
http://www.becketfund.org/hhsinformationcentral/ (last visited Jan. 28, 
2014). 
28
 DiMugno, supra note 4.  (Noting the reason behind many of these 
dismissals was that the DHHS was still finalizing its rules.) See 
Catholic Diocese of Nashville v. Sebelius, 2012 WL 5879796 (M.D. 
Tenn. 2012). 
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B. For-Profit Litigation and Circuit Court Splits  
 
Cases brought by for-profit corporations generally 
do not share the same procedural impediments as their 
nonprofit counterparts
29
 and have reached the United States 
Courts of Appeal on the merits.
30
  Currently, there is a split 
between five Circuit Courts on whether for-profit 
corporations and their owners are able to bring First 
Amendment RFRA claims.
31
  The Seventh and Tenth 
Circuits have held that for-profit corporations and their 
owners have legitimate RFRA claims.
32
  The D.C. Circuit 
Court rejected the corporate claim, but recognized the 
individual claim.
33
  Finally, the Third and Sixth Circuits 
rejected both corporate and individual claims.
34
 
 
1. Seventh and Tenth Circuit Courts 
 
In Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc v. Sebelius, Hobby 
Lobby, a for-profit corporation, and its individual owners 
filed for injunctive relief claiming that the contraception 
mandate for employers violated their religious freedoms by 
compelling them to fund insurance coverage for “drugs or 
devices they consider to induce abortions.”35  In defense of 
                                                 
29
 Id. at 1325. 
30
 Id. at 1326. 
31
 Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 723 F.3d 1114; Korte, 735 F.3d 654, 665; 
Gilardi, 733 F.3d 1208; Autocam Corp. v. Sebelius, 730 F.3d 618 (6th 
Cir. 2013); Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec'y of U.S. Dep't of 
Health & Human Servs., 724 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 2013) cert. granted, 134 
S. Ct. 678 (U.S. 2013). 
32
 Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 723 F.3d 1114; Korte, 735 F.3d 654, 665. 
33
 Gilardi, 733 F.3d at 1216.  
34
 Autocam Corp., 730 F.3d 618; Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp., 
724 F.3d 377. 
35
 Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 723 F.3d at 1141. What is problematic 
about this quote is that it is from the synopsis and this exact quote is 
not found within the case.  The RE or stack checker should have found 
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the PPACA, the Attorney General argued that for-profit 
corporations are not considered “persons” under the RFRA 
because, among other things, Congress did not specifically 
include for-profit corporations as an entity offered rights 
and protections under the RFRA.
36
  Because Congress did 
not specifically define the term “person,” the United States 
contended that the Tenth Circuit should adopted the 
definition of ‘persons’ as defined under other laws that 
excluded corporations.
37
 
The Tenth Circuit agreed that because Congress 
provided no definition for “person” within the RFRA, it left 
such definition to the discretion of the court.
38
  However, 
the Tenth Circuit turned to the Dictionary Act, in which a 
corporation is included in the definition of a “person.”39  
Rejecting the government’s argument, the Tenth Circuit 
held that although other statutes do not include a 
corporation within the definition of a “person,” the court is 
not afforded the power to figuratively cut-and-paste 
definitions from statute to statute.
40
  Accordingly, where 
                                                                                                 
where this was discussed in the case and made the appropriate citation, 
and then changed the language to paraphrase the same point. 
36
 Id. at 1128.  
37
 Id. at 1130 (citing The Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., 
(1964); The Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et 
seq., (2009); the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C.A. § 
203 (2006)). (The United States argues that for-profit corporations are 
not recognized as persons? under these Acts and thus should not be 
given that status under the RFRA). 
38
 Id. at 1129. 
39
 Id.  
40
 Id. at 1130. (Rather than implying that similar narrowing 
constructions should be imported into statutes that do not contain such 
language, they imply Congress is quite capable of narrowing the scope 
of a statutory entitlement or affording a type of statutory exemption 
when it wants to. The corollary to this rule, of course, is that when the 
9
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Congress did not define “person,” the court must default to 
the Dictionary Act.
41
 
In Korte v. Sebelius, the Seventh Circuit addressed 
the same issue.
42
  Like the Tenth Circuit, the Seventh 
Circuit held that corporations and individual owners might 
be successful on the merits of their cases.
43
  However, the 
Seventh Circuit’s analysis differed slightly from that of the 
Tenth Circuit.  Specifically, the Seventh Circuit held that 
“nothing in the Court’s general jurisprudence of corporate 
constitutional rights suggests a non-profit limitation on 
organizational free-exercise rights.”44  
 
2. D.C. Circuit Court 
 
In Gilardi v. U.S. Department of Health & Human 
Services, the D.C. Circuit recognized that individual 
corporate owners might have RFRC standing.  However, 
the D.C. Circuit split from the Tenth and Seventh Circuits 
in its holding that a corporation itself does not have 
standing to bring a claim under a RFRA.
45
  The court 
looked to the “nature and history” surrounding the passage 
of the RFRA.
46
  The court held that the cases that 
                                                                                                 
exemptions are not present, it is not that they are “carried forward” but 
rather that they do not apply). 
41
 Id. at 1129 (In addition, the Supreme Court has affirmed the RFRA 
rights of corporate claimants, notwithstanding the claimants' decision to 
use the corporate form. See O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao do 
Vegetal v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 973, 973 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc), 
aff'd, 546 U.S. 418, 126 S.Ct. 1211, 163 L.Ed.2d 1017 (2006) 
(affirming a RFRA claim brought by “a New Mexico corporation on its 
own behalf”). 
42
 Korte, 735 F.3d at 664. 
43
 Id. at 665.  
44
 Id. at 681. 
45
 Gilardi, 733 F.3d at 1215.  
46
 Id. at 1214. 
10
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influenced the RFRA’s formation concerned individual 
rights, not corporate rights, and therefore they concluded 
that the RFRA does not apply to for-profit corporations.
47
  
Furthermore, the court held that “there is no basis for 
concluding that a secular organization can exercise 
religion.”48  Therefore, in effect, the D.C. Circuit held that 
it is simply not possible to infringe upon a secular 
corporation’s freedom to exercise religion, as the 
corporation is not considered a  “person” under the RFRA.  
The court notes that they are satisfied that the shareholders 
have been “‘injured in a way that is separate and distinct 
from an injury to a corporation.’”49  
 
3. Sixth and Third Circuit Courts  
 
In Autocam Corporation v. Sebelius, Autocam 
Corporation and Autocam Medical, high-volume 
manufacturing corporations owned by a single Catholic 
family, brought RFRA claims seeking injunctive relief 
from the contraception mandate.  The Sixth Circuit held 
that Autocam was barred from bringing an RFRA claim 
because it was not considered a “person” under the RFRA 
and that the shareholders were barred because of the 
shareholder-standing rule.
50
  The court held that the 
plaintiff’s reliance on Citizens United was “unavailing” 
because the Free Exercise Clause and the Free Speech 
Clause have historically been interpreted in different 
ways.
51
  The Court held that while Citizen United identified 
a number of cases where it recognized that corporations 
enjoyed rights under the First Amendment, because these 
cases only concerned freedom of speech, the Court could 
                                                 
47
 Id.  
48
 Id. at 1215. 
49
 Id.  
50
 Autocam Corp., 730 F.3d at 623, 626.  
51
 Id. at 628.   
11
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not concede that the Religious Exercise clause entailed the 
same constitutional treatment.
52
 
 Likewise, in Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. 
Secretary of U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, 
the Third Circuit held that for-profit secular corporations 
could not assert claims under the RFRA because they were 
incapable of engaging in religious exercise.
53
  It held that 
there is no authority applying the Free Exercise Clause of 
the First Amendment to secular for-profit organizations in 
the same way as the Free Speech Clause.
54
  The court held 
that the proximity of the two clauses does not imply that all 
First Amendment rights are afforded to for-profit secular 
corporations.
55
   
 
V. The Future for For-Profit Corporations   
 
While the RFRA protects religious organizations 
and individuals’ religious freedoms from substantially 
burdensome government laws, the courts are addressing for 
the first time whether for-profit corporations are considered 
“persons” who have the ability and right to exercise 
religious freedoms.
56
  Citizen United provides a compelling 
argument, implying that because corporations have a 
distinct voice and enjoy Freedom of Speech rights under 
the First Amendment, those business entities are also 
entitled to Religious Exercise rights as well.
57
 
                                                 
52
 Id.  
53
 Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp., 724 F.3d at 381. 
54
 Id. at 385-86.  The stack checker noted that this passage concerned 
the incorporation of the Free Exercise Clause and not really the direct 
application of the FEC to for-profit corporations.  I wasn’t sure exactly 
how to fix this. 
55
 Id. at 387.  
56
 Mark L. Rienzi, God and the Profits: Is There Religious Liberty for 
Moneymakers?, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 59, 61 (2013). 
57
Id. at 98.   
12
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The primary conflict between the circuit courts 
presents a more complex issue than the right to invoke the 
religious protection of the First Amendment.  Rather, this 
issue arguably requires the reevaluation of a corporation’s 
identity and ability to invoke any First Amendment 
protections.
58
  
In March of 2014, the Supreme Court will have the 
opportunity to address this seemingly philosophical issue 
concerning the identity of the for-profit corporation.
59
  
However, the answer lies behind statutory analysis of the 
RFRA and previous Supreme Court decisions concerning 
corporate rights.
60
  While analyzing the Circuit courts’ 
holdings may provide insight into how the Supreme Court 
will rule concerning for-profit corporations’ identities and 
First Amendment protections, the future of for-profit, 
privately owned corporations is unclear.  
 The idea of “corporate personhood” is not a modern 
idea, but a historical practice that has evolved with our 
country’s democracy.61  In today’s modern economy, a 
business entity can, undoubtedly, have an identity that 
includes specific goals, motives, and morals.
62
  
Additionally, courts have recognized a business entity’s 
ability to act in accordance with certain established 
                                                 
58
 See generally DiMugno, supra note 4.  
59
Lyle Denniston, Court to Rule on Birth-Control Mandate 
(UPDATED), (Nov. 26, 2013), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/11/court-to-rule-on-birth-control-
mandate/.  
60
 Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 723 F.3d at 1129; Korte, 735 F.3d at 681. 
61
 John B. Stanton, Keeping the Faith: How Courts Should Determine 
"Sincerely-Held Religious Belief" in Free Exercise of Religion Claims 
by for-Profit Companies, 59 LOY. L. REV. 723, 748 (2013). 
62
 Id. at 756 (citing Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 
(1983); Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 
546 U.S. 418 (2006)).  
13
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principles. 
63
  What, then, creates the distinction between 
nonprofit and for-profit entities so as to deny for-profit 
corporations the ability to adhere to the same goals, 
motives, and morals?   
As the Tenth Circuit held, there is both objective 
value in protecting a corporation’s right to act in 
accordance with the religious affiliations upon which it was 
built, as well as legal authority to support such protection.
64
  
The Tenth Circuit held in Hobby Lobby that Hobby Lobby 
considered itself a “faith-based” corporation.65  The court 
noted that nonprofits have historically been afforded the 
right to act in accordance with a “faith-based” identity in 
the market place.
66
  In comparison, for-profit corporations 
have a voice that is protected by the First Amendment; 
furthermore, they are required to adhere to specific moral 
and social standards that are in place to benefit and protect 
the general public.
67
  Thus, disallowing a corporation’s 
clear faith-based identity would contradict those moral 
expectations that we as a society impose on corporations, 
and the US Supreme Court has allowed to flourish.  
Accordingly, and in the case of the PPACA, a for-profit 
corporation should be afforded the right to act in 
accordance with a faith-based identity, just as it has been 
offered in those other instances discussed above.
68
  
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
                                                 
63
 THE BECKET FUND, Statutes of Non Profit Cases, (2013), 
http://www.becketfund.org/hhsinformationcentral/#tab1.  
64
 Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 723 F.3d at 1129. 
65
 Id. at 1131.  
66
 Id.   
67
 Steven J. Willis, Corporations, Taxes, and Religion: The Hobby 
Lobby and Conestoga Contraceptive Cases, 65 S.C. L. REV. 1, 44 
(2013). 
68
 Id. 
14
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The United States prides itself on its diversity of 
views, cultures, and religions.  However, respecting and 
protecting the right to speak and act in accordance with 
those beliefs has been of the utmost importance throughout 
the nation’s history.69  The federal government is now 
attempting to alter the definition of for-profit corporations 
in our country by disallowing them to act upon any other 
motivation than monetary ends.  Allowing a for-profit 
corporation to be forthcoming with its foundational 
principles not only reveals its greater purpose, but also puts 
the general public on notice of that purpose while allowing 
the correct implementation of the contraception mandate.  
Rather than restricting the ability of a for-profit corporation 
to act as moral entity, the Supreme Court should consider 
the sincerity of the corporation’s foundational principles.  
By analyzing the sincerity of a for-profit corporation’s 
motivation to adhere to specific principles, the government 
is both recognizing the identity and protecting the rights of 
the for-profit corporation.  
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